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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

On the basis of its inherent power to apply principles of law to a
jury's findings where the "jury just simply refuses to render the required verdict; so long as in so doing the Court does not... substitute
findings of its own for those of the jury,"'139 the Supreme Court, New
York County, amended the jury verdicts in actions one and three. In
court-completed verdicts in actions one and three, P1 and P3 recovered
against Dl, D2 and D3 for the amounts the jury had previously awarded
PI and P3. All other motions, with the exception of D2's motion in
action two to dismiss Dl's complaint, were denied. 140
At first glance, Welborn is a noteworthy example of judicial enterprise since the decision logically interprets the jury's findings of liability. It may be argued, however, that the court should have followed the
usual practice of giving the jury a second opportunity to follow its instructions and thereby render the completed verdicts itself. 141
CPLR 4104: The six-person jury.
This section, which had permitted a party demanding a jury trial
in civil cases to specify a jury composed of twelve or six persons, has
been repealed. 14 The new CPLR 4104 limits to six the number of persons who shall compose a jury in civil actions. In keeping with this
change, CPLR 4105 has been amended to specify that the first six persons who are approved must constitute the jury. Similarly, under CPLR
4109, the number of peremptory challenges has been reduced from six
to three, and, under CPLR 8020(c), the jury fee has been reduced.
Six-person juries will "result in a substantial saving of time and
money to the state, to litigants, and to jurors and their employers, without any substantial reduction in the quality of justice."' 143 In New York
County, it will ease the currently acute problem of obtaining qualified
jurors.
ARTicLE 44-TRuIL MOTIONS

CPLR 4402: Mistrial motion must be made before verdict.
Failure by trial counsel to make a timely objection to the court's
rulings precludes review of the issue on appeal unless the appellate
139 68 Misc. 2d at 857, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 187.
140 Id. at 858, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 138.
141 See 4 WKM 4404.22, citing Note, Inconsistent Jury Verdicts in Civil Actions, 37
NEB. L. REv. 596 (1956); cf. Jacquin v. Syracuse Auto Rental & Taxicab Corp., 263 N.Y. 53,
188 N.E. 154 (1933).
142 L. 1972, ch. 185, at 402, eff. May 28, 1972.
143 4 WKSM
4104.06.
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division, in the exercise of its discretion, finds that facts warrant review
in the "interests of justice."'144
Reaffirming this rule in Schein v. Chest Service Co.,145 the Appellate Division, First Department, conditionally reversed, 146 on the law
and the facts, an order setting aside a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff and granting a new trial. The Supreme Court, New York County,
had made the order on the basis of certain prejudicial testimony by the
plaintiff. Noting that the record indicated that the defendants' counsel
had not objected to the admission of this testimony, the court held that
the defendants had waived their objection by not timely moving for a
147
mistrial.
The strict, but not inflexible, mandate of CPLR 4017148 and decisional law requiring an immediate objection to prejudicial rulings prevents the unfairness to the court and to the opposing party of unnecessary re-trials. 149
ARTICLE 50-JUDGMENTS GENERALLY

CPLR 5004: Interest on judgments fixed at 6%.
GPLR 5004 has been amended to fix the maximum interest rate
payable on judgments at 6% instead of at the "legal rate."'u 0 Difficulties
arose under the former CPLR 5004 as to whether the "legal rate" meant
the established 6% rate or the legal interest rate established by the
State Banking Board pursuant to General Obligations Law section
5-501. The Banking Board had set the rate at 7.25%, and then at 7.5%,
and most courts had held that the rate established by the Banking Board
was the proper interest rate payable on judgments.' 5
It is hoped that this amendment will not "have the incidental effect of making it harder to collect judgments since the judgment debtor
1447 WK&M j 5501.11. Note that the instant court disagreed with the trial court's
finding that the "interests of justice" mandated a new trial. Schein v. Chest Serv. Co.,
58 App. Div. 2d 929, 350 N.Y.S.2d 147, 148 (1st Dep't 1972) (mem.).
145 Id., 550 N.Y.S.2d 147.

146 The court concurred in the lower court's finding that the verdict in the instant
case was excessive. It therefore held that the jury verdict would be set aside and a new
trial ordered unless plaintiff stipulated to accept $5,000 in lieu of the verdict of $15,000
within twenty days of service of the instant order. Id., 30 N.Y.S.2d at 148.
147 Id., citing Hough v. Doersch, 257 App. Div. 842, 12 N.Y.S.2d 50 (2d Dep't 1939),
appeal dismissed, 282 N.Y. 675, 26 N.E.2d 807 (1940); Collins v. Ward, 240 App. Div. 985,
268 N.Y.S. 142 (2d Dep't 1933).
148 CPLR 4017 states that "[flailure to so make known objections may restrict review
upon appeal .. "
149 See 4 WK&M J 4017.03.
150 L. 1972, ch. 358, at 790, eff. Sept. 1, 1972.
151 Trimboli v. Scarpaci Funeral Home Inc., 37 App. Div. 2d 386, 326 N.YS.2d 227
(2d Dep't 1971), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JoHN's L. R .561, 577 (1972);
Rachlin & Co. v. Tra-Mar, Inc., 33 App. Div. 2d 370, 808 N.Y.S.2d 153 (1st Dep't 1970).

